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We have been naught, we shall be all.
(The International)
The world consists of borders. Without borders, there is no world. Not only are 
borders in between all worldly things, but also everything that is potentially 
meets its own border in everything else that it is not. In turn, every something 
is itself the border and the edge of the other and for the other, which it delim-
its, but also shapes. Every body borders another body, being itself the border 
beyond which there is the other-than-itself. This is the structure of the world, 
which operates according to the law of the border, the law of difference. 
The world, as pictured by the physicist, is a world of material bodies. But, in 
trying to find a perfect physical body, the particle of particles, the indivisible, 
science encounters the flexibility of matter and finally arrives at an infinitesimal 
reality as much material as metaphor, from oscillating neutrinos to superstrings 
or quark flavours with their strangeness, charm, beauty, truth, topness, or bot-
tomness. In this material world, as we know it, boundaries are never fixed, since 
even the rocks are moving, and even within crystals there is motion and change. 
 The world as pictured by the mathematician is a world of numerical or geomet-
rical bodies. In his dialogue Timaeus, Plato outlines his theory of the universe, 
and claims that everything is made of triangles. These archaic, tiny triangular 
Platonic bodies are to be identified, without any bias, as a kind of subatomic 
particle, and are sometimes linked to quarks in contemporary physics. One 
might say that the three legs of each triangle are the borders beyond which there 
already lie other triangles.
 Although they have borders, both quarks and tiny triangles cannot exist sepa-
rately or autonomously, but only as constitutive elements of bigger and more 
complex structures. They do not have any internal structure themselves, or, to 
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put it simply, they do not have any consistent inside. Elementary particles – 
prima materia – do not consist of anything, but, instead, everything consists of 
them. Are they not imperceptible pieces of nothing, each being a border between 
nothing and thing, nothing and something, nothing and everything? Pure Being 
and pure nothing are the same, Hegel says.1 What then is the elementary par-
ticle, which contains nothing, if not the border of these two, the border of the 
same, where all difference is produced? 
The world as pictured by the biologist is a world of living bodies, which consist 
of cells. Cells – elementary living bodies – are complex. The borders of their in-
ternal structures are cell membranes, and sometimes (in particular, in the case 
of plants) even cell walls. The world as pictured by the nationalist politician con-
sists of countries, between which there are frontier guards and border controls, 
whereas the world of the political activist implies borders between classes, pow-
ers, privileges, etc. The world as pictured by the sexist or the feminist is made 
of gendered bodies, where the walls between men and women are to be either 
built or destroyed. The world as pictured by the humanist consists of humans 
and other animals, or non-humans (including plants, monsters, vampires, zom-
bies, and aliens), and the boundaries of the human can be either open or closed 
towards what they call non-human. 
The ensemble of borders of the world seems to be all-too-multiple and hetero-
geneous. However, to put it bluntly, there are three essential kinds of borders:
1. The border between something and something similar – between one 
and another triangle, one and another cell, one and another country, one 
and another man, one and another grey cat, one and another clone, etc. 
These are borders within a certain continuity or homogeneity, within a 
certain dimension or a certain genre, where we rather deal with differ-
ences in degree. 
2. The border between something and something different – between differ-
ent dimensions, between man and woman, animal and man, dream and 
reality, organism and mechanism, light and darkness, allowed and pro-
hibited, sacred and profane, external and internal, life and death, good 
and evil, poor and rich, etc. 
1 Hegel’s Science of Logic. London: Routledge, 2002, p. 82.
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3. The border between something and nothing. Not easy to imagine or rep-
resent, this border goes beyond representation or imagination, towards 
the particle made of nothing (which cannot be really observed, but only 
scientifically, mathematically, philosophically deduced from observation 
of some larger entities captured in certain processes). At this border, one 
potentially faces the ultimate edge of the world.
Things can be measured by all three kinds of borders, in various ways. Thus, 
in the dimension of morals, on the first level of borders we can think that we 
choose between different goods, or between the better and the best, but we can 
also seek for the lesser of two evils. On the second level we encounter what is 
supposed to be the border between good and evil. And then, there is still an-
other borderline: to cross it means to go beyond good and evil. 
We say “borderline” as if it were really possible to draw lines between something 
and something alike, something and something unlike, or something and noth-
ing. But, in a way, a line as border, such as the side of a triangle, is not anything 
but the pure in-between of two planes, surfaces, places, bodies, or territories. 
A borderline consists of nothing, but, nevertheless, has two sides, one shifting 
into the other. In some spacious reality, there is no line between a window and a 
cat sitting on it – where the cat ends, the window begins: in between them, there 
are some mixtures of infinitesimals, belonging either rather to the cat or rather 
to the window. There is never a proper line. 
A borderline of the second kind – between cat (as animal) and man – seems 
even less perceptible and even more abstract (although every line is abstract), 
but nevertheless something very serious goes on here in between. A dialectics 
of exclusion and inclusion envelopes this site where a human being either rec-
ognizes or does not recognize, either accepts or rejects her own animality and 
appropriates her own humanity: no less a process than anthropogenesis runs 
along this line. In this process, the human being creates borders – not only be-
tween herself and the animal others, but all borders of all kinds: borders are a 
human way of positing a difference.
Animals do not know borders, do not respect them, or do not take them into 
account. However, they can provide us with some striking knowledge regarding 
what borders are. Thus, borderlines of the second kind can be seen as pass-
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ing through different multiplicities, series, or packs. Each pack, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, has its anomalous or exceptional individual who runs 
alongside the pack. It can be a loner, or the leader of a pack, or an outcast, 
someone who inhabits the edge of a certain whole (like Moby Dick for whales, or 
the Wolf Man, or sorcerers, who live between villages or at the edge of fields and 
woods), being itself “neither an individual nor a species,” but “a phenomenon 
of bordering”:
If you change dimensions, if you add or subtract one, you change multiplicity. 
Thus there is a borderline for each multiplicity; it is in no way a center but rather 
the enveloping line or farthest dimension, as a function of which it is possible to 
count the others, all those lines or dimensions constitute the pack at a given mo-
ment (beyond the borderline, the multiplicity changes nature). […] The elements 
of the pack are only imaginary “dummies,” the characteristics of the pack are only 
symbolic entities; all that counts is the borderline – the anomalous. […] In any 
event, the pack has a borderline, and an anomalous position, whenever in a given 
space an animal is on the line or in the act of drawing the line in relation to which 
all the other members of the pack will fall into one of two halves, left or right: a 
peripheral position, such that it is impossible to tell if the anomalous is still in the 
band, already outside the band, or at the shifting boundary of the band.2
Exceptional individuals create alliances or blocks of becoming, heterogeneous 
combinations of the becoming-animal, through which an infinite production of 
difference is operating. As Catherine Malabou has noted, their “role is to mark 
out the end of a series and the imperceptible move to another possible series, 
like the eye of a needle of affects, the point of passage, by means of which one 
motif is stitched to another.”3 This super-flexible world of multiplicities and se-
ries, where, through the eyes of needles of affects, the anomalous are bordering, 
is measured by intensities of becoming. 
The ultimate borderline of the third kind – the edge of the world – would be, 
however, the most problematic at this point. How is it possible, if possible at all, 
to think of bordering on finitude? How is it possible that on one side we have 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p. 245. 
3 Catherine Malabou, “Who’s Afraid of Hegelian Wolves?” in Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Ox-
ford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 128.
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something, but on the other side there is nothing? The third borderline has only 
one side. This ultimate edge of the world is nowhere, since the nothing cannot 
be anywhere, cannot really occupy this or that place: everyone knows that only 
things occupy places – there is stuff everywhere. But if things, surrounded by 
their borders, occupy all the places, how then is change ever possible? How can 
one ever shift from one series to another? In the world, which is so packed, how 
can a pack change its nature? 
The paradox is that, in the last instance, everything consists of that which does 
not consist of anything. As Žižek puts it, “For a true dialectician, the ultimate 
mystery is not ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’, but ‘Why is there 
nothing rather than something?’: how is it that the more we analyse reality, 
the more we find a void?”4 Is it not that each elementary particle itself, having 
neither internal structure nor autonomous existence, but oscillating between 
various combinations, is a kind of bordering anomalous, which faces nothing 
and makes an alliance, if not a secret pact, with it? As captain Ahab says about 
Moby-Dick (quoted by Deleuze): “‘To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved 
near to me’. The white wall. ‘Sometimes I think there is naught beyond.’”5 
But if this is the structure of the world, then what about the structure of the void 
we border? The void is the void because it does not consist of anything. To be 
more precise, such an exemplary piece of void as an elementary particle does 
not have an internal structure. However, one could say it has an external one. 
What would this structure look like? Matjaž Ličer comments:
The external structure of an elementary particle is a multiplicity of multiplicities 
of other particles born from the energy of its field. This external multitude is the 
particle itself. The particle can only be itself via the detour of its own externality, 
which constitutes, once more, the particle itself. There is nothing on the particle 
that makes it what it is. Everything that it is, it is through its surroundings. The 
corpuscular punctuality, the singularity, the condensation that is the particle, has 
been transformed by quantum field theories to a pure relation. Nothing that was 
postulated as an intrinsic quality of the particle is self-subsisting. 
4  Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London; 
New York: Verso, 2012, p. 925.
5 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 245. 
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The particle mass, the most substantial property of physical substance, has been 
transformed by the Higgs mechanism to a pure relation. The singularity of matter, 
a particle, had been nothing but the way it couples to its surroundings, which it 
structures. Particle mass, treated as a substance, used to be conceptualized as a 
product of two infinities, infinitely large (its density) and infinitely small (its vol-
ume), which results in a well defined finite value. Quantum field theories have set 
strict constraints on such claims, but not by affirming the true radical singularity 
of the old days, but by taming it, renormalizing it, regularizing it. Substance is no 
longer subsisting, it has been transformed into its own externality, to a relation.
But a relation between what? What are the terms of this relation? The particle is 
a relation between something and nothing, between a finitude, a tamed singular-
ity, and an infinity of infinities of virtual particles, emerging from the field of the 
central particle. A particle is nothing BUT this relation. It is a singularity border-
ing on multiplicity, which is, again, the singularity. The multiplicity of multiplici-
ties of virtual particles is what screens the central singularity and normalizes it 
back to finitude. Without this multiplicity the singularity would remain divergent, 
unthinkable in the scope of physics. All the structure that the particle has, it owes 
to its surrounding cloud of virtual particles. All its properties are set and emerge 
through interaction with the cloud that the particle itself generates.6
While an external structure of an elementary particle looks rather soft, like a 
cloud of virtual multiplicities, that of some living organisms, namely, some in-
vertebrates, is a hard one. This completely different kind of external structure is 
called an exoskeleton7. It supports and protects an animal’s body, in contrast to 
the internal skeleton (endoskeleton) of, for example, a human or other mam-
mal. In popular usage, some of the larger kinds of exoskeletons are known as 
“shells”. Examples of exoskeleton animals include insects such as grasshoppers 
and cockroaches, and crustaceans such as crabs and lobsters. The shells of the 
various groups of shelled molluscs, including those of snails, clams, tusk shells, 
chitons, and the nautilus, are also exoskeletons. Mineralised exoskeletons first 
appeared in the fossil record about 550 million years ago, and their evolution is 
considered by some to have played a role in the subsequent Cambrian explosion 
6 These three paragraphs are written by Matjaž Ličer as a commentary on my paper, result-
ing from our productive dialogue around the void. 
7 The metaphor of exoskeleton was suggested by Rasmus Ugilt, who was commenting on the 
first draft of this paper. 
FV_02_2013.indd   168 15. 12. 13   18:39
169
imagine there’s no void
of animals, or, as it is also called, a skeleton revolution (the relatively rapid ap-
pearance of most major forms of animal life as we know it8). 
Indeed, as applied to the void, this metaphor may seem very rough, since here 
the shell is the shell of something, and a lobster is definitely not nothing; how-
ever, it gives us a certain idea of an external structure – the shell constitutes 
the border of a lobster. It is living there, within its own borders; it inhabits itself 
as the sole citizen of its lobster-land, and at the same time through its border it 
comes into relation to the other-than-itself – to the other lobster, to the other-
than-a-lobster, but also to the nothing. After all, we remove the shell and devour 
the lobster, similarly as those beasts from Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”, 
which, just like initiates of the Eleusinian mysteries, desperately negate things 
by devouring them9. 
But imagine there is no lobster. Is it not that, in a way, a void can hide itself in 
a shell, too? Furthermore, what if everything that is is either a virtual cloud, or 
a shell of the nothing: the multiplicity of being as an external structure of the 
void? And, finally, can we remove the shell and devour the void, as we devour 
the lobster? This last question would bring us to the notorious logic of the com-
modity, the logic of the little nothing as a surplus on top of the use-value of what 
we consume. However, the void cannot be reduced to a commodity. Commodity-
void is just a small part of an entire void-complex. In the large, I propose to 
consider at least three essential kinds of void:
1. The void as substance;
2. The void as subject;
3. The void as universal, or real.
In order to approach the first kind of void – the void as substance – I will refer 
to one example from recent Russian literature, namely a book by Victor Pelevin 
entitled Chapaev and Pustota10 (which was translated into English as Buddha’s 
Little Finger). This book was written in the 1990s, the time of the onset of gallop-
8 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambrian_explosion.
9 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1979, 
p. 65.
10 In Russian, “pustota” means “void”.
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ing capitalist development in Russia. The protagonist of this novel, whose name 
is Pyotr Void (Pustota), is a patient at a psychiatry clinic. He identifies himself 
with Petka, an assistant of Chapaev. 
Vasily Ivanovich Chapaev was a celebrated Russian soldier and Red Army com-
mander during the Russian Civil War. After the Soviet Union had been estab-
lished, Chapayev was immortalised by Soviet propaganda as a hero of the Rus-
sian Civil War in a popular book by Dmitry Furmanov and in a 1934 movie by 
the Vasilyev brothers. In later years, Chapayev became a recurring character in 
numerous Russian anecdotes. Pelevin’s book is set in two different times – right 
after the October revolution and in modern post-socialist Russia. In the post-
revolutionary period Pyotr Pustota is a poet. He meets a strange man named 
Vasily Chapaev, who is some sort of an army commander, but also a kind of a 
Buddhist guru. Pustota spends his days drinking home-distilled vodka, sniffing 
cocaine, and discussing metaphysical questions with Chapayev. Here is one of 
their dialogs, in which Chapaev persistently interrogates Pustota about what he 
thinks he is:
What do you call “I”? – Clearly, myself. – Can you tell me who you are? – Pyotr 
Voyd. – That’s your name. But who is it bears that name? – …If you have no objec-
tion, then I regard myself as … Well, let us say, a monad. In Leibniz’s sense of the 
word. – Then just who is it who goes around regarding himself as this gonad? – 
The monad itself… – …Tell me, where’s it live, this gonad of yours? – In my con-
sciousness. – And where is your consciousness? – Right here,” I said, tapping 
myself on the head. – And where is your head? – On my shoulders. – And where 
are your shoulders? – In a room. – And where is the room? – In a building. – And 
where is the building? – In Russia. – And where is Russia? – In the deepest trou-
ble, Vasily Ivanovich.11
A little later in the same episode Pyotr manages to give a properly correct an-
swer to Chapaev’s question “Where are you?” – “Nowhere”.12 The void is not 
only the name of a protagonist, but also a central category of this novel, whose 
main characters are in search of a kind of inner void within the shell of a deeply 
pathological, disturbing, and annoying post-Soviet reality. This book by Pelevin 
11 Viktor Pelevin, Bhudda’s Little Finger, trans. by Andrew Bromfield. Penguin Books, 2001, 
pp. 139-140.
12 Ibid., p. 144.
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is one of the major examples of Russian postmodern prose of the 1990s, the 
background and entire paradigm of which is quite clear: after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union the ideological structure of society is changing so fast that the 
subject cannot grasp even the shadow of the core of some consistent external 
reality. The idea that it hardly exists at all actively penetrates consciousness to-
gether with different new-age ideas, Buddhism, and other, say, oriental wisdom 
with its essential search for a void. 
At the same time, the previously forbidden French philosophy of the twenti-
eth century finally enters Russian culture and takes there a paradoxical twist. 
Phenomenology, post-structuralism, deconstruction, the entire combination of 
anti-totalitarian struggles, resistances, and reflections labelled as the thought 
of May ‘68, and what Benjamin Noys now characterises as the affirmationist 
consensus or even as the affirmationist doxa (with its hostility, first of all, to 
negativity, dialectics, subject, truth, etc.)13, together with the aforementioned 
oriental wisdom, are investing in the widespread nihilism of a nascent Russian 
capitalist society. 
In this context, the void is represented as a kind of positive substance – albeit 
the inner self as an empty place, deprived of any content, or an external reality 
that does not deserve to be believed in (like Russia in trouble), or an ideal uto-
pian place, where there is only a void as a permanent condition of happiness, 
satisfaction, or nirvana. It is a reversed dialectics of the subject becoming sub-
stance. The subject seeks for the void of his inner self, which will finally allow it 
to be absorbed by the outer emptiness of the Universe. 
Of course, Russia is not the only place where one can find numerous examples 
of such voids as the ultimate capitalist wisdom. They can be found everywhere. 
What capitalism attacks, what it cannot tolerate, is the other kind of void. This, 
I would say, negatively active void appears only in retrospect. This other void is 
perfectly resumed in a formula from The International: “We have been naught, 
we shall be all.” Capitalism replaces this void to fulfil it with the abundance of 
commodity behind which the subject is seeking the thing and enjoyment: in 
the shell of commodity, capitalism sells us an unlobster to devour. We devour 
13 See: Benjamin Noys, The Persistence of the Negative: A Critique of Contemporary Continen-
tal Theory. Edinburgh University Press, 2010.
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the void, but are never satisfied, never become full – and the void devours us. 
The emptiness of the new-age utopia is one of those commodified objects that 
pretend to be the substantial all of the world. Thus the ideological emptiness 
clothes itself in the mantle of an ontological completeness. 
Let me now continue with the second kind of void – the void as subject. This 
kind of void can be described not as emptiness, but rather as loss. One can easily 
recognise here the language of contemporary psychoanalysis, which still pro-
vides us with one of the most convincing and advanced theories on the subject. 
Thus, one of the principal stakes of Less than Nothing, as well as of the rest of 
Žižek’s recent work, is its proclaimed materialist account of subjectivity, which 
emerges from the encounter of Hegelian and Lacanian subjects to find its deter-
mination in a profound indeterminateness – as a constitutive rupture, a cut, a 
split, or a void in the chain of a certain determinate reality or certain processes. 
The Žižekian subject is a monstrous creature of both Hegelian negativity and the 
Freudian death drive. 
In Žižek’s broader ontology and philosophy of nature, all material reality the 
subject deals with seems to constitute itself through the void. The more material 
and bodily is the Žižekian subject, the more it faces and borders nothing. Now, 
through the mediation of the void, the substance becomes subject. It is not that 
thought just intervenes into being with the mediation of nothing, but it is the 
void of being itself that is opened up by the gap of the subject. As Žižek speci-
fies, “This nothing is not the Oriental or mystical Void of eternal peace, but the 
nothingness of a pure gap (antagonism, tension, “contradiction”), the pure form 
of dislocation ontologically preceding any dislocated content.”14 
To return to the aforementioned  capitalist commodity, what it proposes to us is 
a fetish that promises in vain to fulfil the void opened up by this gap, the void 
that the subject experiences as the loss of the thing itself, and which capitalism 
sells her in the shell of the thing. It attempts to close the negative void as subject 
with a void as a positive substance. The void as subject depends on this idea of 
the lost and forgotten, and at the same time unforgettable, since an experience 
of this loss constitutes the subject’s very being, and the very being thus shows 
up as the void. 
14  Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing, p. 35. 
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Joan Copjec, in her great feminist account of Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis, in 
the book called Imagine There’s No Woman, emphasises the affinity of this expe-
rience to the loss of a primordial mother and the primordial enjoyment attached 
to her.15 But, of course, it can also be the loss of a primordial father, which makes 
the absent law absolutely repressive and opens up a kind of ultimate injustice 
and the arbitrariness of it, etc. In brief, the subject of psychoanalysis is an or-
phan child. A Lacanian subject is always in a lack, missing something essential, 
the thing itself, the enjoyment itself, and even if we hand him the entire world on 
a silver platter, he will never get any happier, because he knows that the world 
is not all. On the other hand, one can say that he is overwhelmed with the too-
much-ness of the not-all of the world: it is always too much, but it is never all.
But what about the void of being itself, introduced by the orphan subject? I 
can only schematically approach this third kind of void, the void as universal. 
Think about Joan Copjec’s title. In the introduction to her book she explains 
why she chose it by referencing Lacan’s quotation from Alfred Jarry’s Ubu Roi: 
“Long live Poland, for without Poland there would be no Poles!”16 According 
to Copjec, “Lacan is recommending a new ethical imperative: ‘Imagine there’s 
no Poland!’.”17 This formulation runs across his essay “Kant with Sade”, where 
the Père Ubu quotation plays a decisive role. In his Encore, Lacan, as Copjec 
emphasises, rephrases the imperative to counter Ubu’s as “Imagine there’s no 
woman!” Here no less than universals are at stake. Of course, there is no woman 
as such, but only particular women, but how is the existence of these particular 
women ever possible without the woman herself? Copjec explains:
Lacan does not argue that there are no universals, only particular things; rather, 
he maintains that universals are real. To limit one’s observation only to appear-
ances, to particular things, is to overlook the existence of the real, which is pre-
cisely what makes an all of being impossible. In other words, if there are only 
appearances in their particularity, this is due to the fact that the real, a by-product 
or residue of thought, detaches itself from thought to form its internal limit. This 
limit has both a synthesizing function that universalizes by causing thought to re-
volve around it and a detotalizing function, since it subtracts itself from thought. 
15 See: Joan Copjec, Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, London, 2002, p. 32 and elsewhere in the work. 
16 Ibid., p. 1.
17 Ibid., p. 4.
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This subtraction, in turn, “establishes a fracture, a bi-partition, a splitting” in the 
order of being as appearance.18
Let us borrow from Žižek another example of a universal as real. In the chapter 
of his Less than Nothing “The Animal that I Am” he develops his critique of Der-
rida’s deconstruction of the distinction between human and animal. I must point 
out that his paper on the same topic, which has been presented elsewhere,19 was 
entitled “The Animal Does Not Exist”. This title shifts from Derridean to Lacan-
ian mode and actually brings the same formula: “Imagine there’s no animal!”. 
On Derrida’s general dismissal of a binary logic presupposed by this distinction, 
Žižek replies in Hegelese: 
It is not only that, say, the totalization effected under the heading “the animal” 
involves the violent obliteration of a complex multiplicity; it is also that the vio-
lent reduction of such a multiplicity to a minimal difference is the moment of 
truth. That is to say, the multiplicity of animal forms is to be conceived as a series 
of attempts to resolve some basic antagonism or tension which defines animality 
as such, a tension which can only be formulated from a minimal distance, once 
humans are involved.20
Going back to the idea of commodity, at this point Žižek recalls the Marxian 
elaboration of the general equivalent from the first edition of the first Volume 
of Capital: 
It is as if, alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all other actual ani-
mals, which form when grouped together the various kinds, species, subspecies, 
families, etc., of the animal kingdom, there existed in addition the animal, the 
individual incarnation of the entire animal kingdom.21
Žižek asks: “Does not this image of money as ‘the animal’ romping alongside all 
the heterogeneous instances of particular sorts of animality that exist around it 
capture what Derrida describes as the gap that separates the Animal from the 
18 Ibid., p. 3. 
19 It was presented at the conference Human Animal in Berlin in December 2011.
20 Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing, p. 408.
21 Karl Marx, Value: Studies, trans. Albert Dragstedt, London: New Park, 1976. Quoted from: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/commodity.htm.
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multiplicity of actual animal life?”22 What he is interested in is precisely this 
gap, since “what man encounters in the Animal is itself in the oppositional de-
termination: viewed as an animal, man is the spectral animal existing along-
side really existing animal kinds.”23 In its alongsideness, the animal borders the 
nothing. It hardly exists, but it embodies the border between the void and the 
multiplicity of existing animals, being at the same time a kind of inexistent ele-
ment of this very multiplicity.
Let us now take a turn from this inexistent element of a multiplicity to an anom-
alous, which runs alongside each pack and, being not at all representative of 
this multiplicity or pack, nevertheless forms its border. This brings me back to 
one of my initial points: prima materia consists of elements which do not have 
autonomous existence, the elements which are themselves the borders of the 
void and which constitute its external structure. The prima materia is like a sor-
cerer, who, as they say, does not have a backside, because it literally sits upon 
the void of nothing. 
Is it not that this totally imperceptible one-sided borderline is a grain of free-
dom, which withdraws every piece of matter from the void? If so, then the edge 
of the world is everywhere. Insofar as we border not only something, albeit 
something similar or different from us, but also nothing, which opens up our 
horizon of similarities and differences, we are the edge of the world. All of us – 
particles and antiparticles, men, cells, cats, windows, Poles, women, subjects, 
bodies, lobsters, sorcerers, triangles, and others – are involved in this risky bor-
dering, where actual movements and potential changes are at stake. Of course, 
the anomalous animal of the universal void appears only in retrospect, when 
we are supposed to withdraw it from the shell of things which are. But imagine 
there’s no nothing! A world with no nothing would be nothing but a world with 
no borders and no difference, ruled by an ideology of the false emptiness to 
devour, where any motion brings the same back to the same, and where Russia 
will remain forever in its deepest trouble.
22  Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing, p. 408. 
23  Ibid.
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